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The institutional origins of global demography 
Until about ten thousand years ago, when the agricultural revolution began, the 
global population of human beings probably numbered a few million. Settled 
agriculture allowed population to start rising steadily, but very slowly, so that by AD 
1 it probably numbered 200-300 millions. It reached one billion around 1800, and two 
billion some time before the outbreak of the Second World War. The four billion 
mark was reached in 1960 and global population is currently around 6.7 billion (Livi-
Bacci 2001)1. It has perhaps always been possible to imagine a global population of 
human beings, to describe it, albeit in such rudimentary terms, and even attribute 
different qualities and behaviour to it. The concept of the human species is a very old 
one, of course, and one which contemporary biology gives an ever more specific 
understanding and meaning to. However a specifically demographic understanding of 
the global human population, understood as an integrated population system, has 
until very recently never been more than a strictly theoretical proposition.  
For a start, it was simply not possible to study global population, as there were no 
good sources of data about it. The figures cited above are intelligent guesswork 
based on extrapolation from limited sources. Moreover, until the efforts of the United 
Nations (UN) began at the end of the 1940s, there had been little interest in it. 
                                                
1 Unless otherwise stated the sources for data quoted in the text is the United Nations Population 
Division World Population Prospects 2006 revision Population Database, available at 
http://esa.un.org/unpp. More recent estimates, where available, have also been used. 
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Demography is a relatively recent science born out of the information and 
surveillance needs of the modern nation state. Being a statistical discipline in the true 
sense of the word (Mackenzie 1981) it only developed with the appearance and 
consolidation of national statistical systems in the most advanced states towards the 
end of the 19th century (Dupaqier 1985).  Accordingly, as a discipline, its concept of 
population has almost always been banally nationalist (Billig 1995) in the strongest 
possible sense. It treated each state as comprising a population in its own right, and 
thus to the twin basic components of the ‘demographic equation’ – fertility (births) 
and mortality (deaths) were added those of in- and out- migration defined in terms 
of state boundaries.  
Until the issue of global population growth first became a concern in the late 1940s, 
virtually the entire corpus of scientific literature addressed national state interests, or 
the application of such interests to lower level territorial administrative units – cities, 
counties, provinces and so on. This continues to be true. Indeed it is the territorial 
unit within which people live that has become demography’s object of study, rather 
than population as a reproductive system. One result of this theoretical weakness, 
combined with its institutional dependence on the state, has been a tendency for 
demography to be driven by the prevailing fears and obsessions of the governing 
classes, concentrating on the proximate causes of any alarming trend in demographic 
phenomena (Foucault 1989; Teitelbaum and Winter 1985).  There has rarely been any 
shortage of these.  
Its birth as a modern discipline was closely bound up with eugenics (Mackenzie 
1976; Soloway 1990) and in the early decades of the twentieth century many national 
demographies joined in the battle for higher fertility in the professional or ‘fitter’ 
classes, or for stronger population growth than that of rival states (Szreter 1996). 
There has also been a tendency to understand demographic behaviour in moral 
terms, resulting either in variants of catastophism, a tradition well established by 
Malthus’s original Essay (1970), continued by Spengler’s Decline of the West (1928) and 
culminating in Ehrlich’s predictions of mass global famine in The Population Bomb 
(1968).  
The establishment of what might be thought of as global demography both 
continued and challenged this tradition. Reliable statistical knowledge about global 
population had to wait until the creation of the United Nations in the aftermath of 
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the Second World War, and the development of censuses across the entire planet by 
its Population Division (UNPD) established in 1946 (Caldwell and Caldwell 1986), 
although what was to become the International Union for the Scientific Study of 
Population (IUSSP) held its first world conference in 1927, and the Milbank 
Memorial Fund had later established the Office of Population Research at Princeton. 
The United Nations’ activities can be seen as the institutional embryo of a global 
demography, but originally in a highly ambiguous way. Its origin and early fortunes 
lay less in the material globalization of population processes than in the world 
superpower status of the post-war United States of America, and the apprehension of 
its governing class over the geopolitical consequences of population growth in the 
developing ‘third world’. In part via the United Nations, but also through the 
activities of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and the US State Department, 
global demography became a cold war weapon. The early statistical work of the UN 
suggested that population growth in the third world was much faster than had been 
expected (in turn the early data itself proved to be an underestimate). Not only was 
such global population growth seen as unsustainable, and likely to impede 
economic, political and social development, but in the context of the cold war it was 
also seen as likely to create, literally, a breeding ground for the spread of 
communism. This was the backdrop to the publication of The Population Bomb in 
which Ehrlich asserted that global overpopulation was about to make Malthus’ 
prediction a reality:’[t]he battle to feed all of humanity is over… In the 1970s the 
world will undergo famines – hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to 
death’ (1968: xi). The fact that Ehrlich was a biologist rather than a demographer did 
not stop his views having a substantial impact.  
The answer was seen to lie in encouraging family planning and access to cheap 
contraception with the UN’s role shifting from one of data collection and analysis to 
policy intervention to support family planning programmes under the auspices of 
the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) established in 1967 with million dollar funding 
from the United States. As Demeny (2003: 13) notes, from the 1960s to 1980s 
‘population policy in the developing world became essentially synonymous with 
family planning programs.’ The UN established a series of World Population 
conferences which became intergovernmental conference  from the time of the 1974 
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Bucharest meeting as demography became more relevant to states’ geopolitical 
interests.  
 
Demographic transition theory 
The academic paradigm used to analyse demographic change was demographic 
transition theory. In the first decades of the century demographers on both sides of 
the Atlantic (Willcox 1916; Carr-Saunders 1922; Thompson 1929; Landry 1934) had all 
suggested that economic and social modernization was eventually accompanied by a 
steep decline in both mortality and fertility, with a relatively short period in which 
fertility falls might lag behind mortality falls, producing a rapid but temporary 
expansion of population. At the time of its original development this theory attracted 
little attention (Szreter 1993) since European demographers were more interested in 
what Glass (1936) called The Struggle for Population: the problem of what was thought 
(wrongly) to be below-replacement levels of fertility in 1930s Europe and whether 
modern industrial society and the family were compatible (Davis 1937)2. However, in 
the context of a global cold war, what was originally a theory developed from the 
studying industrialised countries and framed in terms of demographic consequences 
that had their origins in social, economic and political change, became recast as a 
theory of how policies aimed at directly changing demographic behaviour 
(principally fertility) might, on the contrary, cause desirable social, economic and 
political consequences in non-industrialised countries (Szreter 1993, Hodgson 1988). 
Population control was argued to be fundamental to economic development, and 
informed a great deal of policy and intervention in developing countries. Meanwhile, 
demographic transition theory became virtually the only analytical framework for 
academic demography, helped on its way by its formulation in economic terms by 
the Household Economics of Becker (1991) (Robinson 1997).  
This approach eventually suffered two fundamental reverses. At the 1974 Bucharest 
population conference many third world countries rejected the UN’s draft World 
                                                
2 Replacement level fertility is a term used by demographers to refer to that level of fertility necessary 
in a population to maintain its current volume in the long term.  Frequently this level is stated to be a 
total fertiltiy rate (see below) of 2.1 children per woman. This is a misnomer however. It applies only in 
populations where all women survive to the end of their fertile years, and takes no account of falling 
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Population Plan because of its background assumption that demographic change was 
more a cause than result of underdevelopment. Alarmed at threats to their state 
sovereignty implied by a global population initiative and frustrated at any progress 
on the UN’s part in challenging global economic inequality they declared that 
‘Economic development is the best contraceptive’. At Mexico ten years later, bowing 
to pressure from the religious right, rather than any recognition of changed 
development priorities, the US delegation announced, to the astonishment of others, 
that population growth was a ‘neutral phenomenon’ in relation to economic 
development (Finkle and McIntosh 2002). By the time of what was to be the last such 
conference, in Cairo in 1994, the development perspective of population policy was 
dropped altogether and the rationale became, instead  ‘that the programs satisfy 
important health needs and help people exercise a fundamental human right. … 
even though the name of the conference for the first time included a reference to 
development, scant attention was paid to that concept. Family planning programs 
were redefined, instead, as reproductive health programs’ (Demeny 2003: 15). Five 
years earlier the fall of the Berlin wall removed much of the original rationale for the 
United States’ strategic interest in demography, rendering the return to dominance of 
a religious moral conservative discourse much less relevant than it might otherwise 
have been.  
Meanwhile demographic transition theory continued to be a plausible general 
empirical description of demographic history, but fell apart as a body of work capable 
of generating testable hypotheses or predicting the future course of demographic 
trends. In the original model ‘the whole process of modernisation’ (trade, 
technological innovation, specialisation, a widening division of labour, the rise of 
labour and product markets, industrialisation, urbanisation, formal education, 
growth of scientific and medical knowledge) first lowered mortality, then gave 
people a new interest in lowering fertility and finally recognition of this interest. 
‘Natural’ fertility control, the virtual absence of any widespread family limitation 
and ‘a surprising lack of knowledge’ (Cleland and Wilson 1987: 13) of contraception 
given almost universal understanding of procreation, was argued to give way to 
                                                
mortality or of migration, both of which may push the level of replacement fertility well below the 2.1 
mark.   
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parity-specific, conscious, birth-control3. The professional classes were usually the 
most rapidly affected, but others soon followed. In some versions of the theory this 
was because industrial capitalism reversed the previously positive material and 
political impact of having children. However, one of the largest empirical social 
science research projects ever mounted, the Princeton study on the fall of fertility in 
Europe, singularly failed to produce evidence consistent with the theory’s original 
postulates and struggled to identify any cross national or regional correlation 
between the ‘whole process of modernisation’ and fertility fall (Coale and Watkins 
1986). The variety of pre-transition fertility behaviour could hardly be subsumed 
under a single ‘natural’ variant. Moving beyond Europe it became clear that 
although fertility falls were virtually universal by the start of the twenty-first 
century, they occurred under all kinds of different social, political, economic and 
even demographic conditions. As Cleland (2001: 62) noted ‘in the last 40 years the 
onset of fertility transition has occurred in settings where infant mortality is 150 per 
thousand live births and survival at older ages is correspondingly low. In other 
settings, birth rates have remained unchanged until infant mortality dropped to 50 
per thousand.’ Conversely, it was far from clear just how effective ‘family planning’ 
campaigns in developing countries inspired by diffusion theory had been. However, 
in a classic example of Kuhn’s theory of the evolution of scientific thought (Kuhn 
1962) transition theory continued unchallenged as the discipline’s paradigm even as 
the empirical dimensions of its shortcomings became ever more apparent.  
Because of this institutional and theoretical background, demography has until 
recently shown less interest in the theory of globalization than other social sciences, 
such as economics, political science or sociology, although it has certainly been in the 
business of producing data about the demographic ‘aspects’ of globalization.  By the 
latter we understand the progressive integration of the diverse systems that form 
human relations into one general system (in areas such as politics, finance, history, 
production, commerce, ideology and so on). However it is perhaps no accident that 
reliable information about the population of the world has become available, through 
the efforts of the United Nations, just at the point when, as we argue below, a 
genuinely global population system has first emerged as a material reality and when 
                                                
3 Demographers use the rerm ‘parity’ to refer to the number and order of births. Thus partiy specific 
control refers to control aimed at producing a specific final desired number of children. 
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the pace of demographic change has been greater than ever before in human history, 
and probably greater than it ever will be again.  
 
Population as a reproductive system  
In order to understand population dynamics in global terms, it is first of all necessary 
to distinguish two quite different uses of the term population: that between 
population as a stock and as a flow. As a stock, population is an accounting term. A 
population is simply a group of objects sharing one or more common characteristics 
at a point in time, including a group of people defined in this way, usually in terms 
of residence within a territory. With this definition it is possible, at most, to study the 
exchanges, mixing and displacements between diverse ‘stocks’, in other words, 
migration patterns.  Included in such movements would be ethnic movements on a 
grand scale, such as the Germanic invasions of the declining Roman Empire, or the 
Spanish and Portuguese conquests of the Americas, as well as all manner of other 
ways in which more or less isolated ‘populations’ have managed their contact with 
those beyond their territorial or ethnic boundaries.  However this does not bring us 
any closer to the idea of a global population system and its analysis 
As we have argued elsewhere (MacInnes and Pérez 2009a), the key tool of 
demography is to define populations not as stocks but as flows: as reproductive 
systems which continue over time, as opposed to their mortal individual human 
components.  This allows us to examine, for example, the ‘efficiency’ of a population, 
taking into account the very diverse combinations of existing structural conditions 
and individual behaviours, and the ‘input’ (in terms of births and associated 
reproductive work needed to convert infants into adults themselves capable of 
carrying on such work), given such conditions, needed to maintain a population over 
time. If we understand populations as a flow in this way, it also becomes possible to 
think of globalization in properly demographic terms, and to examine the extent to 
which the population system itself has become global. We try to do both below, in 
order to argue that existing diverse population systems are rapidly fusing into one 
global population system, whose outlines can be sketched. This newly emerging 
system comprises a quite new mode of reproduction characterised, on the one hand, 
by an unprecedented and unrepeatable transformation in the system’s efficiency (one 
might even think in terms of the forces of reproduction) and, on the other hand, by 
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the transformation of its social relations such that power and decision-making 
relating to fertility becomes, for the first time, individual and private rather than 
collective and public. However to understand what follows, a short but necessary 
methodological argument must be made. 
Demography has its own special terminology and as an overwhelmingly quantitative 
discipline, it own indicators and measurements. Understanding the subtleties of two 
of these makes a critical appreciation of contemporary population change much 
more readily accessible to non-demographers. Since population is a flow, and 
demographic events occur across the life course, a population’s  characteristics at any 
point in time cannot fully by grasped by ‘period’ or transversal measures, since they 
have no way of distinguishing how far age-dependent variables (which naturally 
form the essence of demographic analysis) reveal attitudes or behaviour that is 
rooted in change across successive generations, or cohorts, or  changes across the life 
course within such generations, or some mixture of both. In addition, ‘crude’ 
measures, which express demographic events (such as births deaths marriages or 
divorces) as proportions of or rates within the population for a given time period can 
be misleading since different populations have very different age structures, and 
most demographic events are highly dependent on age. For example, a population 
with a high proportion of young people may have a lower crude death rate 
compared to another population with a low proportion of young people, even 
though life expectancy in the former population is much lower, for the simple reason 
that deaths, by definition, occur at the end of people’s lives. When demographic 
change is rapid, as it surely has been across most of the world over the last century, 
cohort-based measures, which study the entire reproductive life course of a 
generation, may give a fuller account of change, but with the grave drawback that 
they can only be completed in retrospect. In practice ‘complete’ can be taken to mean 
women’s reproductive behaviour up to the age of forty, since very few women (and 
surprisingly few men, despite their longer fecundity) become biological parents after 
this age. However this still means that in the year 2010, we can only have reasonably 
complete fertility information about women born as early as 1970.  With mortality 
the problem is clearly greater. We may not know the actual life expectancy of those 
born in 1970 for another ninety years or so. 
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Clearly it is impossible to obtain future knowledge. However it is possible to 
produce ‘synthetic’ measures that capture something of the dynamics of population, 
albeit from a transversal perspective. Two of these are important for our analysis 
here, the total fertility rate and life expectancy at birth. Crude birth rates depend upon 
the age structure of a population at a point in time. Other things equal, a population 
with a high proportion of women in fertile ages  (conventionally taken as 15 to 45, or 
49) will have a higher crude birth rate. Age-specific fertility rates can be calculated for 
each year or five-year age group, and these facilitate comparison across populations 
with different age structures. Making many such comparisons would often be a 
laborious exercise, so that a total fertility rate (TFR) is calculated which gives the 
fertility rate that would result were each woman to experience across her lifespan the 
age-specific fertility rates for all women for that calendar year. This measure is 
synthetic because it represents what must be a longitudinal process as a transversal 
one. It inevitably makes assumptions about the ‘future’ behaviour of younger 
members of the population in terms of current evidence of the behaviour of older 
members. This can lead to significant distortions when behaviour is changing over 
time. Such distortions are inevitable: we cannot know the future. However we can be 
aware of these distortions and do our best to interpret such synthetic evidence in the 
light of what we know about change. A second, and easily overlooked, limitation of 
the TFR is that it takes no account of mortality. This becomes important when we 
consider population trends over time and population replacement. Other things 
equal, a population with substantial early mortality will need a much higher TFR to 
reproduce itself. This is because many births will be partly or wholly ‘wasted’ from 
the perspective of reproducing the population if female children die before reaching 
the end of their fertile years. Moreover, a population with higher mortality will need 
a correspondingly higher fertility rate to maintain a given volume of population. In 
fact this will vary directly with mean life expectancy. If people live twice as long, the 
same fertility rate will deliver twice the volume of population (Henry 1965). 
Life expectancy at birth (e0) is a similar synthetic measure calculating the mean years of 
life that would be achieved by someone born in a population today who experienced 
the age-specific mortality rates prevailing today in that population across their life 
course. Life expectancy clearly suffers the same drawback as total fertility. We might 
expect that the trend reduction in mortality rates will continue  (although it would be 
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foolish to discount the possibility of some new epidemiological challenge) in which 
case the actual life expectancy of those born today will almost certainly be 
significantly higher. Again this arises because we only know the real life expectancy 
of the already dead, and predominantly older, members of the population at the 
current point in time. However, life expectancy at birth has one further shortcoming 
for the unwary. It is an average measure but one that is often highly skewed and has 
a wide dispersion, particularly in countries with low life expectancies. This is 
because for many populations the risk of death may actually be highest in the earliest 
years of life. In most of the world until the second half of this century up to one 
quarter or more of infants born died before their first birthday. Famines or epidemics 
might double this number for short periods. Such mortality reduces life expectancy 
dramatically, so that for most of human history it has probably been around 25 to 30 
for most populations most of the time. However this does not mean that most people 
died at thirty. It means rather that their chances of survival to older ages were 
modest. A quarter might be dead before reaching five years of age, further similar 
proportions by their fifteenth and fiftieth  birthdays, while a lucky few might live on 
into their eighties or nineties. 
 
The prehistory of population 
In history it is usually misleading to refer in general terms to ‘the past’, as if it were 
some coagulated, unchanging mass.  However, in demography it has rather more 
justification than usual because the magnitude and speed of recent change is indeed 
not only unprecedented but also logically impossible to repeat. What dominated the 
past was premature death. If populations comprise human groups with both 
continuity over time and their own diverse ways of achieving such continuity, such 
diversity was almost universally rigidly conditioned until the eighteenth century 
(and for many areas of the world until much more recently) by low life expectancy 
and the very high risk of an early death. In what Omran (1971: 512) called ‘the age of 
pestilence and famine … life expectancy was short and human misery was assured’. 
Data is scanty and requires painstaking effort to reconstruct, but it appears that 
crude mortality rates oscillated erratically with epidemics, famine or warfare 
between a range of around 20 to 50 per 1,000 (but with occasional much higher 
peaks) while mean life expectancy at birth ranged from around twenty to the low 
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thirties (Omran 1971; Coale 1986; Livi Bacci 2001; Riley 2001). A poor harvest, 
adverse weather, warfare, brigandage or epidemics easily severed what was always 
a tenuous hold on life for most ordinary people and intermittently sent mortality 
rates heavenward. Less than a half of most female populations might expect to live 
through their entire reproductive years if we define these as ending at 45. Such 
factors did not directly impose the details of whatever survival strategy a population 
might choose, but they did impose the need to control fertility, subject to two 
conflicting pressures. Fertility had to be kept high enough to balance the ravages of a 
high and volatile mortality rate, but too high a rate of fertility might, if it led to too 
many mouths to feed, drive mortality up on its own account.   
Within this stage we can find many quite distinct demographic systems, each of 
which tried to maintain such fertility as was necessary to secure the reproduction of 
population in the long run, along with checks to avoid fertility levels that might 
expand the population beyond a level that available resources and technology could 
support. In many parts of Asia the early and widespread marriage of women was 
combined with infanticide in adverse times (Lee and Feng1999). In Western Europe 
(Hajnal 1965) it was marriage that was controlled, rather than fertility within it, with 
marriage ages increasing, and fertility rates decreasing, when times were hard. 
Indeed Laslett (2000) suggests that England’s demographic system not only 
vanquished famine as a significant contributor to mortality as early as the sixteenth 
century, but can plausibly be seen as an important precondition of the world´s first 
industrial revolution.  
Elites more concerned with their descendents’ inheritance of their wealth and power 
sometimes practiced fertility control (Henry 1956). To their (somewhat) better 
survival rates and life expectancy was added the concern to avoid ‘diluting’ their 
estate, offset by their need to secure an heir. Both social elites, and particular 
territorial areas (such as governing cities) had mechanisms to ‘adopt’ the produce of 
other populations to the goal of their own survival. However, logically, these were 
not strategies that could be extended to the entire population so that even in Western 
Europe the norm was levels of fertility far above our current experience, with 
completed fertilities (that is the mean number of children a cohort of women would 
have in their lifetimes) no lower than four (Laslett’s minimum estimate for England) 
and often nearer five or six. Since averages take no account of the significant 
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proportion of women who never married, and include women dieing before 
reaching the end of their reproductive years, this translated everywhere into very 
large family sizes. Laslett reports 21 births as the maximum encountered for any one 
woman in the historical reconstruction of English demography. The diverse 
demographic systems in operation had one common feature, namely the intense 
regulation of the means of reproduction, women’s bodies, principally through the 
institutions of church and state, the norms surrounding sexual activity and sex roles, 
illegitimacy, marriage, family and kinship obligations and property law. Patriarchy 
might have taken many forms, but we have no good empirical evidence of any 
hitherto existing society without it.  
 
The Decline of Mortality 
From around the middle of the eighteenth century, although possibly earlier in 
England, mortality was slowly conquered by improvements in nutrition, medical 
knowledge, public health, sanitation and economic progress. Figure 1 shows just 
how gradual this change was, using the data for Sweden that allows us to track 
changes in cohort life expectancy at birth (rather than its more widely available 
period equivalent) from an unusually early date. Note how progress in the struggle 
against mortality is fitful until the final quarter of the nineteenth century, however 
by the end of that century victory is well established, such that mean life expectancy 
reached 70 for those born in 1916. 
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Figure 1 Life expectancy by birth cohort, Sweden 1751-1916. 
 
Source: Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or 
www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on Jan 04 2009); 
 
As we have seen, demography eventually came to understand this fall as part of the 
demographic transition, but the initial reaction to falling mortality and fertility was 
more often the fear that low fertility might lead to a stationary or even declining 
population (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985). It was in this context that eugenicist 
alarms were sounded about the prospect of ‘race suicide’  driven by ‘neo-Malthusian’ 
family limitation by within the ‘fittest’ (i.e. wealthiest) strata of the population. 
Feminism came in for particular criticism, being blamed for diverting women from 
their naturally determined and inexorable maternal vocation and threatening ‘sex 
extinction’ (Kenealy 1920). One exception to this reaction was the work of Alva 
Myrdal, who almost alone amongst early theorists of demographic change argued in 
Nation and Family (1939) that greater gender equality and the collectivisation of the 
costs of rearing children through fiscal transfers and public provision of services 
would sustain fertility. Myrdal’s work can be seen as the intellectual genesis of what 
was to become the Scandinavian welfare state. This current in demographic thought 
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weakened with the post-war baby boom (which actually had its origins in the 1930s) 
and, as we have seen above, once the focus became the populations of the developing 
world, the demographic transition model, originally developed to explain the 
experience of North-west Europe, was now used to make the case that high, not low 
fertility was the problem. However it never disappeared entirely, continuing to 
underpin French demography’s fusion of nationalism and natalism as exemplified in 
the work of Sauvy (1959) or Dumont (2008) and subject to withering criticism by Le 
Bras (1991; 1998), so that when fertility rates resumed their downward trend in 
Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, it promptly re-emerged (MacInnes and Pérez 2007). 
 
The rise of mass maturity 
The development of the world's population over the last half century can perhaps 
best be illustrated with a single fact. By 2000, the majority of those who had 
comprised the world’s population in 1950 were dead. Fifty years from now, however, 
most of those alive today will still be around, despite the fact that the average age of 
the world's inhabitants is now higher than it was in 1950 (a median of 29 years 
compared to 24). This is because the biggest social change of the 20th century was the 
defeat, across almost all of the world, and for the first time in human history, of 
premature death. In 1950, seven out of ten of the world’s women lived in countries 
with female life expectancy at birth under 65 years.  Life expectancy was well below 
this threshold throughout Africa and Asia, where it was generally in the low 40s, and 
Latin America and the Caribbean, in the low 50s. Only in Europe, North America, 
Australia and New Zealand, Israel, Cyprus, Armenia, and by a whisker, Japan, could 
women expect to reach old age, thus defined. Even within Europe most of the 
Balkans, Romania, Spain and Portugal still fell below this threshold. Country 
averages conceal differences by region, class or ethnicity within states so that 
although White women in the US comfortably exceeded the threshold in 1950, black 
or African American women did not pass it for almost another ten years.  By the first 
decade of the new millenium however, except in sub-Saharan Africa, and a handful 
of countries beyond (Bangladesh, Haiti, Cambodia, Laos, Ethiopia and Eritrea), 
women could be confident of reaching their 65th birthday. 
What became evident as the twentieth century progressed was that mortality 
declines which had developed over some centuries in Europe, were achieved much 
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more rapidly in developing countries, thanks to their ability to take advantage of 
improvements in medical knowledge, especially in combating infectious diseases, 
and recognition of the importance of public health and education, as well the impact 
of rising nutrition levels and living standards provided by economic development 
(Riley 2001). Figure 2 shows the fall in infant mortality in Sweden, Spain, Chile and 
Egypt. An achievement that had taken well over a century in Sweden was achieved 
by Spain in half that time and by developing countries elsewhere still more rapidly.  
Table 1 compares the under five mortality rates (the number of children per 1,000 
live births who die before their fifth birthday) in 1970 and 2005 for a range of 
countries, as well as the percentage of each cohort born around 2005 that would 
reach their 40th birthday given current mortality rates. As recently as 1970 these 
mortality rates were often up to ten times those of affluent countries.  However by 
the start of the new millennium, most developing countries had largely closed this 
gap, and many had overtaken the Russian Federation in terms of life expectancy. The 
exceptions were to be found mostly in sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Table 1 Under 5 mortality and probability of reaching age 40, 1970 & 2005 
Under 5 mortality ‰ Country 
1970 2005 
Survival to age 
40 (2005)   
US 26 7  96.5 
Russian Federation 36 18 89.3 
China 120 27 93.2 
Turkey 201 29 93.5 
Brazil 135 33 90.8 
Egypt  235 33 92.5 
Iran 191 36 92.2 
Bangladesh 239 73 83.6 
India  202 74 83.2 
Pakistan 181 99 84.6 
Myanmar 179 105 79.0 
Ethiopia 239 164 67.7 
Nigeria 265 194 61.0 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo  245 205 58.9 
 
Figure 2 Infant Mortality (‰): Sweden, Spain Chile and Egypt 1801-2005 
 
Sources: Human Mortality Database. University of California, Berkeley (USA), and Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or 
www.humanmortality.de (data downloaded on June 24 2008); Chesnais (1986: Annexe 5.3); Child 
Mortality since the 1960s: A Database for Developing Countries, United Nations Department of Economic 
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and Social Development, NY: 1962; Anuario De Estadísticas Vitales 2005, Santiago de Chile: Instituto 
Nacional d’Estadistica. 
 
Such mortality falls were usually followed rapidly by corresponding falls in fertility, 
resulting in the great rise in the efficiency of global population reproduction. At first, 
and for a relatively short period, the result of this improvement was the rapid 
expansion of the global population which expanded faster in absolute terms than it 
had ever done before, and, in all likelihood, will ever do again, rising from around 
two and a half billion in 1950 to around 6.7 billion in 2009. This expansion is now 
coming to an end, although population momentum will probably carry the global 
population above 9 million by the middle of this century. However the more 
enduring effect has been the fall in the proportion of social effort devoted to fertility, 
through the greatly reduced volume of births needed to sustain a population. This 
fundamental shift has precipitated an even greater social revolution, which is 
spreading around the planet: the rise of personal autonomy in fertility decision-
making, the consequent erosion of patriarchy (to the point of collapse in much of the 
North) and the rise of gender quality (MacInnes and Pérez 2009b).  
Figure 3 shows the general outline of this process for the world as a whole. The 
annual volume of births, which in 1950 stood at just under 100 million, grew by 
around one third by 2005. The volume of population more than doubled however, 
from 2.5 to 6.7 billion, as these births have given rise to longer lives. The increase in 
the volume of births stayed modest even though the global population of women of 
fertile age almost trebled, because fertility rates fell rapidly.  
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Figure 3 World births and population 1950-2005 
 
Figure 4 shows the details of this process for the world, divided into three major 
regions: the more developed countries, less developed, and the least developed.4 It 
plots the fertility (TFR) for each of these areas against life expectancy at birth (e0) for 
each five-year period from 1950 to 2005, representing each area in proportion to its 
population in each period. The figure illustrates four aspects of change across this 
half century. First, rises in life expectancy quickly became associated with falls in 
fertility: the circles move rapidly leftwards within a few years of shifting upwards. 
Second, change has been greatest in the less developed countries, which have 
                                                
4 We use the United Nations definitions: the more developed countires comprise all of Europe and 
Northern America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The less developed regions comprise all 
regions of Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America and the Caribbean, Melanesia, Micronesia 
and Polynesia, excluding the least developed countries as defined by the United Nations General 
Assembly in December 2003: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of 
Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, 
Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal,Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, 
Tuvalu, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. 
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achieved levels of fertility and life expectancy previously reached only by 
industrialised states. Third, progress in the least developed countries stalled after the 
1970s: fertility continued to fall, but gains in life expectancy halted. Finally, the 
dramatic convergence between the more and less developed countries means that for 
the first time we can analyse a truly global population system. 
Figure 4 Life expectancy at birth, fertility and population size at five year intervals 
for more, less and least developed countries, 1950 - 2005. 
 
 
Of course, the emergence of a global population system has taken place in a world 
structured by great inequalities of material affluence. The relationship between 
fertility, life expectancy and the standard of living as measured by individual or 
state-wide income or wealth has been a favourite and controversial field of 
investigation, above all by economists.(e.g. Lee 1981, Schultz 1985, Becker 1991). 
Without entering into the detail of the debate, we can note two points relevant to our 
argument here. It is clear that the reproductive revolution can begin even with a 
modest level of development. Many countries with levels of GDP well below that of 
the richest countries nevertheless manage to approach their life expectancy rates, 
chiefly by reducing murderous levels of infant mortality. However, 
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underdevelopment, especially when compounded by political disorder, civil and 
ethnic warfare and the effect of HIV, can also reverse progression on mortality: the 
experience of much of sub-Saharan Africa. Second, economic development itself does 
not erase inequalities in life expectancy, either between states or within them.  In 
most less developed countries, infant mortality rates for the poorest quintile of the 
population are two to four times higher than for the richest quintile. A recent study 
in Scotland examining the spatial distribution of mortality found an inner city area of 
Glasgow, characterised by poverty, unemployment and drug abuse, where male life 
expectancy was 54: the level for some of the world’s poorest countries. In an affluent 
suburb nearby it was no less than thirty years higher.  
Around 2008 about ten per cent of the world’s people lived in states where GDP per 
capita was 1,500$ or less. Conversely their counterparts in Europe and North 
America lived in states with economies that were over twenty times richer, and as we 
shall see below, this disparity maps directly onto wages and living standards. It is 
Perhaps it is because of the magnitude of this difference, one that makes it hard to 
think in global terms when the everyday conditions of life vary so much across areas 
of the world, that less notice than one might have expected has been taken not only 
of demographic progress, in the sense of longer, healthier lives, but of demographic 
convergence, in the sense of the patterns of population reproduction and the 
particular form the latter have taken. Demographic progress has also been 
overlooked because one large area of the world has not only missed out on it but has 
been deteriorating. Life expectancy in parts of sub Saharan Africa has been falling 
and fertility falls there have mostly stalled (Bongaarts 2008).  Finally the fragile state 
of theory within demography as a discipline, dominated by the demographic 
transition paradigm, has often obscured the wider significance of such convergence . 
The last half century of world population history has been about the rise in cohort 
life expectancy: the inexorable increase in the proportions of successive generations 
reaching older age points. Although the precise mechanisms of the linkage may be 
heterogeneous, wherever they have take place such improvements have been 
associated with the rapid arrival not just of lower fertility but fertility levels 
previously only ever experienced in affluent countries before and after the baby 
boom, in the 1930s, and since the 1960s. The world is very rapidly becoming one in 
which most women who do have children will have only one or two. The result of 
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this is what has come to be known as ‘population ageing’: an increase in each 
country in the proportion of older cohorts and corresponding decrease in the 
proportion of younger cohorts. Its precise from and impact varies a good deal across 
countries, but it is a thoroughly global phenomenon. In affluent societies it has 
usually been seen as a challenging or threatening development. On the contrary, we 
argue below that this democratisation of longevity, for that is what it is, has been the 
twentieth century’s greatest achievement. 
 
The decline of fertility  
In the early 1950s, if we looked beyond Europe, North America, Australasia and 
Japan, just a handful of countries, accounting for less that 2% of the world’s 
population, had total fertility rates under five. The only states of any size with 
fertility levels below this were Argentina (at 3.2) and North Korea (3.4). In the rest of 
the world, accounting for over three fifths of its population, the fertility rate was over 
six.  In countries as diverse as Mexico, Turkey, Algeria, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Iran or the 
Philippines, it was around seven. It must be borne in mind that fertility rates of this 
magnitude, given the proportion of women who never married, were infertile or 
who died before reaching the end of their fertile years, implied a much greater 
numbers of births for most mothers. This was especially so because beyond the 
industrialised states, life expectancy at birth was almost universally low: around 40 
for both Asia and Africa, and a little over ten years more in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Table 2). 
Fifty years later, less than the span of a couple of generations, we find a picture that 
is utterly transformed for all but that tenth of the world’s population condemned to 
live in sub-Saharan Africa. Elsewhere, only four countries in the world now have a 
fertility rate above five: Afghanistan, Yemen, Oman and the Occupied Territory of 
the Gaza strip. Half the world’s population now live in countries with fertility rates 
near or below what demographers sometimes refer to as ‘replacement level’ (roughly 
speaking the fertility level needed to replace the current population, assuming that 
no women die before reaching the end of their reproductive years). Among the 
countries with ‘below replacement fertility’ are not only such well know cases as 
China, Singapore or South Korea, but less publicised examples such as Algeria, Iran, 
Viet Nam, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand or Turkey. Indeed, as Figure 6 suggests, 
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despite the publicity its ‘one child’ policy has received, the fertility drop in China has 
been no greater than that in many other rapidly developing countries. Fertility rates 
pay little attention to either the ideology of the regime in power or religion. The 
United States now has a higher fertility rate than either Viet Nam, governed by the 
Vietnamese Communist Party, or Iran, officially a Shia Muslim Theocracy.    
While world fertility has almost halved since 1950, life expectancy at birth has 
increased by one half, rising at around five years per decade. Fifty years ago, in most 
of the world, around one in six or one in seven babies died before their first birthday. 
Today in sub-Saharan Africa almost one in twelve still die. Elsewhere, almost half the 
world’s people live in countries where infant mortality is 25 per thousand or below: 
rates similar to those of the United States or the UK in the early 1960s. 
Table 2 Fertility, life expectancy at birth and infant mortality by major world 
region 1950-5 and 2000-5 
 1950-5   200-5   
 Fertility 
rate (TFR) 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth (e0) 
(both sexes) 
Infant 
mortality 
(‰) 
Fertility 
rate (TFR) 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth (e0) 
(both sexes) 
Infant 
mortality 
(‰) 
N Africa 6.9 41.8 189 2.9 68.2 41 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
6.8 37.6 177 5.2 51.0 80 
Asia 5.9 41.0 176 2.4 70.8 30 
Europe 2.7 65.6 72 1.5 75.2 7 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
5.9 51.4  2.4 73.1 22 
N. America 3.5 72.0 29 2.0 78.4 6 
Oceania 3.7 66.7 61 2.3 77.8 13 
       
World 5.1 46.4 153 2.6 69.5 32 
Source: 1950-55: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United 
Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 
2005 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp, January 4, 2009; 2008: Central Intelligence Agency The 2008 
World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html, January 
4, 2009. 
 
Figure 5 shows the very high relationship between fertility and life expectancy for 
the largest 25 countries in the world, which account for about three quarters of world 
population, comparing their position in 1950 and now. The light grey circles 
represent countries around 2005, and the black ones those same countries around 
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1950-55. It can be seen that fifty years ago two quite distinct demographic regimes 
existed. A few countries – the USA, UK, France Germany, Italy, Japan Russia and the 
Ukraine, represented by the cluster of eight black circles at the top right hand side of 
the graph, enjoyed relatively long life expectancies and had lower fertility rates than 
countries elsewhere. All the other largest countries were clustered at the lower left 
hand side of the graph with high mortality and correspondingly high fertility. Fifty 
years on, and it can readily be seen that with a few exceptions, the cluster from the 
bottom left of the graph has joined those at the top right, although the latter have 
continued to develop still lower rates of fertility and longer life expectancies.  
There is also a remarkable absence of countries from the middle of the graph. We 
find this effect too if we repeat the graph for all countries. This is because when 
fertility and mortality fall they neither drift down gradually nor do they appear to 
arrive at other end points, although, as the experience of sub-Saharan Africa shows, 
such development is not automatic. It is here we find virtually the only countries 
where the shift to a new demographic regime has ‘stalled’ (Bongaarts 2008).  
 
Figure 5 Total Fertility and Life expectancy at birth , 1950-5 and 2000-5 
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Figure 6 shows the process in rather more detail for the eight largest countries of the 
world (which account for just over half its population). In addition to the data 
contained in figure 2 countries are depicted proportional to the size of their 
population in each of the two time periods, and current GDP per capita (in US$ ppp) 
and infant mortality rates (per 1,000 live births) are shown for the later period.   
 
Figure 6 Total Fertility, Life expectancy at birth , GDP and infant mortality 1950-5 
and 2000-5. 
 
 
 
Migration 
The development of a global demographic regime has also changed migration. It has 
often been assumed that globalisation has caused unprecedented spatial mobility 
(e.g. Urry 2000), especially across national frontiers, but as we shall see, states’ 
determination to police such mobility has kept migration below the levels reached 
before the First World War. Almost the entire cost of this is borne by the world’s 
poor. Indeed, states spend about one third as much on maintaining migration 
controls as they do on all development aid (Pritchett 2006) It is often forgotten that 
25 
the world’s most powerful state was not only founded by migrants, but continues to 
derive its demographic momentum from them. It was only at the beginning of the 
twentieth century that most states either developed much interest in controlling 
migration across their frontiers, or the means to do so (Torpey 1999). Indeed whether 
they ever have or ever will be able to do so effectively is doubtful. Despite spending 
billions of dollars attempting to control its border with Mexico, using unmanned 
drones, seismic sensors, and some 36,000 border guards (Economist 3 January 2008) 
more than half a million migrants are estimated to enter the US unlawfully each year, 
on top of the million who enter as official permanent residents, and a third of a 
million granted temporary entry. Some do not make it. 453 people died attempting to 
cross this border in 2005: about twice the number of those killed trying to cross the 
Berlin Wall in its 27 year history. The US thus dominates contemporary global 
migration. 
Emigration to the colonies was not only substantial from the seventeenth century 
onwards, it was associated with the mass destruction and genocide of indigenous 
peoples in North and South America, the Caribbean, Australia and elsewhere. An 
estimated 15 million slaves were taken to the Americas by 1850 (when world where 
population was less than one quarter of today’s total). Potts (1990) estimates that up 
to 37 million indentured labourers were used in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries in systems analogous to slavery. Around 55 million Europeans emigrated 
to the colonies between 1850 and 1914 mostly to the United States. This ‘raised the 
New World labour force by a third, and decreased the Old World labour force by an 
eighth’ (Hatton and Williamson 1998: 4). Industrialisation also drove international 
migration within Europe, of Irish and Jews to Britain, of Poles, Italians, Belgians and 
Dutch to Germany, and of many different countries to France. Polanyi (1944) argues 
that the free movement of labour was one of the key elements of the capitalist order 
that fell apart after World War 1.  
It is often forgotten that the world’s ‘huddled masses’ who emigrated to the United 
States, both then and now, did so not only because of political exile or economic 
oppression, important though these were, but also because of economic opportunity. 
Hatton and Williamson (1998:35) estimate wages in the receiving countries in the 
1870s at 50 per cent higher than those prevailing in Great Britain, around double 
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those in Germany, and between two and three times those in Ireland, Norway, 
Sweden and Italy.  
Just as states responded to the economic depression of the interwar period with 
protectionist policies, they began to restrict immigration.  The United States started 
to regulate immigration from the 1880s onwards, on racial grounds, first barring 
Chinese and Asians, and under the influence of eugenic ideas, Southern Europeans 
and Latin Americans in 1920 (Mosisa 2002). An exception to the general picture was 
France, where the vast loss of men in the Great War, combined with a long 
established low fertility rate, led to the inflow of some two million immigrants in the 
1920s, many of whom were promptly sacked and deported as the 1930s depression 
took hold (Castles and Miller 2003).  
The long global capitalist boom that followed from the end of the Second World War 
to the oil shock of the 1970s also stimulated migration, such as the that from the 
Commonwealth countries to the UK, or the ‘guestworker’ system in Germany that 
drew in some two million Turks. By the end of the boom between six and eight per 
cent of the populations of most European countries comprised foreign born 
immigrants. While immigration to the United States did not feature in the long boom 
(instead this was characterised by the mass migration of blacks from the southern 
states) the reform of its immigration legislation in 1965 led to a steady increase in 
immigration till it reached its current volume. 
By 2005 the UN estimated that 190 million people were international migrants, 
almost 3% of the world’s population, rather more than double the volume of thirty 
years ago. Of these some 13 million were refuges. However accurate data on 
migration in general and refugees in particular are difficult to collect since much 
immigration is clandestine, in some countries the status of refugees is contested, and 
in the poorer countries of sub-Saharan Africa, ravaged by civil and ethnic warfare, 
estimates of the numbers involved is a question of enlightened guesswork. 
International migration today is dominated by flows of people towards richer 
economies in search of work, whether in formal or informal employment, that is 
usually precarious, badly paid or with poor or unsafe conditions of work that make it 
unattractive to the resident established population. However many migrants are 
relatively highly skilled: a World Bank survey 2000 of OECD economies estimated 
that over one third have college educations. The single country with the largest 
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migrant stock is the United States, with 38 million migrants, 13% of its population. 
Europe, excluding the former Soviet bloc countries, has some 42 millions while the 
Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus have about half that number, although here 
many ‘migrants’ are people who have become so as a result of changes in borders 
and citizenship definitions, rather than by any movement of population.  The rich 
Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the Emirates hold 
another 13 million migrants, accounting for over one third of their populations. One 
investigation found construction workers in Dubai earning 400-500 dirhams a month 
(90-110$) for working 60 hours a week or more. Housed in labour camps they had no 
access to healthcare or civil or political rights, such as the right to form unions, while 
the employment agency held their passports (Guardian, 8 October 2008). For illegal 
workers without papers, conditions were much worse. 
Singapore and Hong Hong hold 5 million migrants, just over two-fifths of their 
population, while Australia and New Zealand account for another 5 million 
migrants, around one fifth of their populations. However not all richer countries 
depend on migration. Japan has only 2 million migrants, less than 2% of its 
population. The proportion in South Korea, and Thailand is similar, whereas Viet 
Nam claims to have just twenty thousand migrants in a population of 84 million.  
However, although these volumes of migration at first sight appear to be high, they 
are well below the levels of movement across the Atlantic in the forty years before  
1914, despite the fact that several forces encouraging migration have become much 
stronger since then (Pritchett 2006). Technological change has revolutionised both 
travel and communications not only making migration cheaper, faster, safer and 
easier but also by facilitating that social support networks that are often vital to it. 
Economic and cultural globalisation, sustained by new communications technology 
such as satellite broadcasting and the web, together with the end of the cold war and 
increased fluidity in geopolitics, has probably reduced the cultural and symbolic 
distance between people in different parts of the world. Increases in absolute 
standards of living almost everywhere beyond sub-Saharan Africa, together with the 
great increase in urbanisation, mean that more of the world’s poor than ever before 
have the minimum resources necessary to put the desire to migrate into practice. 
There is now, for probably the first time in history a genuinely global proletariat, 
whose size is growing rapidly. Finally, and most importantly, income differentials 
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between rich and poor countries are far higher than those between the old and new 
worlds at the end of the nineteenth century. The last two points deserve more 
detailed attention. 
As Table 3 shows, since 1980, the global workforce has increased by more than half, 
from 1.9 to 3.1 billion, and almost all of that increase has been in the less developed 
countries, and associated with urbanisation, as shown in Table 4. However this 
comparison understates the degree of change, since until around the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, much of the economic activity in the Soviet bloc, India and China was only 
very weakly integrated into the global capitalist market. Freeman (2005) thus 
suggests that the gobal proletariat probably doubled in size during the 1980s and 
1990s, and most importantly, brought a vast army of increasingly well-qualified 
workers paid a fraction of the wages typical of older industrialised countries into the 
global marketplace.  
 
Table 3 Economically Active Population (15+)  1980 – 2006 (millions) 
 2006 1980 Increase % Increase 
More developed countries  608 516 92 18 
Less developed countries  2477 1387 1091 79 
of which      
Africa  366 172 194 113 
Asia  1912 1142 769 67 
Latin America & the Caribbean  263 126 136 108 
World  3085 1903 1183 62 
Source: International labour Organisation Estimates and projections of the 
economically active population: 1980-2020 (fifth edition, August 2008), available at 
http://laborsta.ilo.org, data downloaded 19 January 2009.  
 
Table 4 Urban population as % of total population 1950-2010 
Year More developed  Less developed  Least developed  World 
1950 52.5 19.4 7.3 29.1 
1970 64.6 26.9 13.1 36.0 
1990 71.2 37.2 21.0 43.0 
2000 73.1 42.6 24.8 46.6 
2010 75.0 48.1 29.4 50.6 
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International comparisons of wages are bedevilled by the need to find units of 
comparison across vastly different social and economic contexts, but Ashenfelter and 
Jurajda (2004) have proposed an ingenious answer to this problem by analysing the 
wages paid for the almost identical jobs done by McDonald’s restaurant food 
preparation staff in capital cities in different countries. The Japanese  ‘McWage’ is no 
less than 27 times its Indian counterpart. Adjusted for ‘Big Macs per hour’ (the 
number of another virtually identical product that can be purchased with an hour of 
the McWage) the differential falls to about 13, and adjusted for purchasing power 
parity using the World bank’s world development indicators, it is six.  
It thus seems clear that wage differentials between developed and developing states 
now are three to seven times as large as those between the old and new worlds in the 
previous age of mass migration. Moreover, within developed OECD countries, 
McWages differ little. This paradox is easily explained by immigration controls. 
McDonalds employees in India, China or Columbia cannot enter Japan, the EU or 
USA, while migration between advanced states is much easier. They must continue 
to work three of four hours to earn enough for the same Big Mac that their 
counterparts in developed countries achieve in a little over twenty minutes.  
Debate over the significance of migration often hinges on comparing the impact 
upon developing countries of the ‘brain drain’ represented by such immigration, 
compared to the benefits it may offer them, especially in terms of the remittances 
sent by migrants, which at up to half a trillion dollars annually represent by far the 
biggest flow of resources from richer to developing countries. Also important are 
what have been called ‘social remittances’: the diffusion of new ideas, attitudes, 
behaviours, products, information, and technology facilitated by migration. 
However, as Pritchett (2006) has argued, it has been rich states ability to prevent the 
kind of migration that established the New World in the decades up to 1914 that 
locks most of the global proletariat out of equal participation in contemporary world 
capitalist development in what he terms ‘everything but labour’ globalisation. 
Estimates of the economic impact of liberalising labour migration depend upon too 
many assumptions to be precise, but even marginal changes, enough to increase rich 
states’ labour forces by three per cent, would bring estimated annual benefits of at 
least one third of a trillion dollars to workers from poor countries.  
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The McWage in developed countries is so high relative to others, not only because 
most of the global proletariat are excluded, but because post-industrial economies 
generate not only highly skilled employment, but what Baumol (1967) termed 
‘technologically non-progressive activities’: service work that can neither be 
automated nor, typically, performed remotely from the site of its consumption 
because it requires the physical presence of the person providing it rendering it ‘non-
tradable’ (e.g. cleaning). As Marx (1976) described in his General Law of Capitalist 
Accumulation, as technological innovation displaces labour, it flows to sectors where 
such innovation is not possible. Someone must be there to hand over your Big Mac, 
while bank teller operations can be undertaken by a cash dispensing machine, or call 
centres located anywhere in the globe. Such non-tradable service activities are 
concentrated in personal care, or reproduction, which takes us back to the starting 
point of this chapter.  
 
The Global Reproductive Revolution 
Stand outside a school in Barcelona and you will see large numbers of mothers from 
Peru, Mexico, Ecuador and other Latin American countries taking the children to 
school.  However it is not their own children they bring, the latter are usually still in 
Latin America. They are ‘Canguros’: childminders. Others care for the elderly or 
work in such occupations such as cleaning, retailing or catering. Spain stands out 
since illegal migration there from Latin America is facilitated by the low risk of 
deportation, the high chance of regularization, and a common language, while the 
dearth of public services for either child or elder care increases the private demand 
for such reproductive work. According to the Labour Force Survey (which may well 
undercount undocumented workers) over a million such women have arrived there 
since 2000, three quarters of them aged from 16 to 54. 
Both such migration and the changes in mortality and fertility we have considered 
earlier can be seen as part of the final, global stages of the general reproductive 
revolution which has accompanied the rise of modernity. Migration within states is 
linked to international migration, insofar as the move to urban centres may be the 
first stage in international migration, and both are driven by the development of the 
global market. The expansion of the latter, in turn is bound up with the shift of 
resources from the reproduction of people to the production of commodities made 
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possible by the reproductive revolution. Meanwhile the expansion of population 
made possible by the latter in its early stages has produced what can be seen as a 
global workforce. Domestic and international migration can be seen as the result of 
the ability of capital to draw the surplus population released by this processinto both 
the production of goods and reproduction of people. 
Zelinksy (1971) outlined a theory of what he called ‘the mobility transition’. Social 
and spatial mobility is first stimulated by uneven economic development, such as the 
concentration of industry in urban centres, or the process of colonisation of ‘virgin’ 
territories by the imperial powers. As the demographic transition advances, lowering 
the increase in surplus population, the focus of mobility shifts towards the 
redistribution of the population within the economically more developed areas, so 
that for example, population declines in inner city areas, suburban sprawl develops, 
rural depopulation comes to an end, until ultimately mobility becomes 
predominantly a function of the rise and decline of different sectors of the economy 
and the relative attractiveness of different spatial locations in a world with little 
surplus population to be drawn into the system, since the latter has become global: 
what he called ‘the super-advanced society of the future’.  
In a sense Zelisnky was only filling in some of the empirical detail to Marx and 
Engel’s precocious portrait, over a century earlier, of the creation of a global 
capitalist system which was subjecting the country to the rule of the towns and 
drawing barbarian nations into civilisation, using raw materials ‘drawn from the 
remotest zones’ for products to be consumed, ‘in every quarter of the globe’ and 
smashing all ‘fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable 
prejudices and opinions’ (Marx and Engels 1976: 486-9). However Zelinsky’s theory 
draws greater attention than their simpler formulation to the relationship between 
reproduction and production. A further step in such theorisation was the work of 
Cabré (1999) on the demographic history of Catalonia, which showed how the 
reproduction of population in this region of Spain had from an early stage depended 
heavily on in-migration. In this sense the earlier demographic history of Catalonia 
serves as a precursor to what has become the emergence of a new global pattern to 
the reproduction of population: with one exception. Just as towns usually drew no 
barriers around themselves to migration (although at times this was attempted in 
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Russia and China) there was no frontier between Catalonia and the destitute agrarian 
Spanish hinterland on which it drew.  
The global fall of fertility, and rise in life expectancy can be seen as perhaps the most 
revolutionary shift of all, since it at once undermines one of the most important roots 
of patriarchy, while at the same time liberating a tremendous proportion of social 
effort previously devoted to reproduction to for use in production, analogous to the 
way in which the revolution in agricultural productivity released labour from the 
countryside for work in industry, or de-industrialisation enabled the growth of the 
service sector (MacInnes and Pérez 2009b). The way in which this revolution 
produced a period of rapid global population growth, made possible the creation of 
a truly global market system and expanding world proletariat in the final two 
decades of the last century.  For a few decades to come this new system will continue 
to be characterised by the both domestic and international migration flows as the 
surplus population created by the early stages of the reproductive revolution is 
drawn towards the centres of economic development.  
However, as fertility continues to fall, and the economies of Asia and Latin America 
continue to expand, the size of this surplus population, and the migration flows 
associated with it, will reduce rapidly. Meanwhile, both the male breadwinner 
system, and other forms of gender inequality in production and reproduction will 
continue to be undermined, first by the declining relevance of the social regulation of 
fertility, and later by the declining weight of specifically reproductive work in society 
as a whole.  At the same time, as lifespans continue to increase, and the years of 
healthy of life available after retirement rise steadily, issues of intergenerational 
equity will become more important. In the longer term, the global capitalist system 
will at some point in the future run out of surplus population for the first time in its 
history. Henceforth its ability to generate such a surplus will indeed depend upon its 
ability to slough off labour from established sectors of production faster than it can 
be absorbed by newly emerging ones. The probable considerable tightening of the 
global labour supply might augur well for further social progress. 
Of course the actual course of such development will depend on all manner of 
unpredictable empirical change. Much will depend on whether a way is found to 
liberate Africa from its political, economic and demographic prison, and on whether 
the institutions of global trade and commerce manage the shift in economic power 
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from the North to the East without either collapsing or veering towards some post 
cold war system of economic blocks. 
 The population of Europe is already dependent on immigration to continue rising, 
and it looks as if the world population itself will likely soon reach a maximum at 
around 9 billion (Lutz 2004). Mortality will continue to fall, but it is far from clear 
where its limits lie (Olshansky, Carnes y Cassel 1990; Wilmoth 1997; Wilmoth et al. 
1999, 2000). Already more than half of the world’s population of those over 65 live 
outside more developed countries. The proportion of what are sometimes called the 
‘oldest old’, those over 80, will grow rapidly, so that on current projections, the 
world will have over 400 million octogenarians by 2050, three quarters of whom will 
live in what are today classed as less or least developed countries. However it is 
unclear what extra demand, if any, this will place on health and welfare systems. As 
long as healthy life expectancy (something intrinsically more difficult to measure than 
the span of life itself) continues to increase with life expectancy, and morbidity 
continues to be concentrated in the final years of life, then there may be little extra 
demand. Conversely, to the extent that new interventions become possible to combat 
the very different patterns of mortality and morbidity found in populations with 
longer lifespans, and to the extent that older people demand higher standards of 
healthy living made possible by new treatments and technologies, then demand may 
increase greatly.  
Nor is the future course of fertility clear. In contrast to the fears expressed by many 
demographers that fertility might have no lower limit, and that rapid population 
decline be in prospect for many countries in Europe or elsewhere, few have noticed 
that since before the turn of the century, fertility has been rising almost everywhere 
in Europe, and in other affluent countries too. However the course of history will be 
shaped by the development for the first time of a global reproductive system with  
no surplus population to colonise. This might further increase the pressure towards 
gender equality, made possible by the reproductive revolution, analogous to the way 
in which the long boom of 1945 to 1973 eroded the foundations of the male 
breadwinner system in North America and Europe. Insofar as it does so, humankind 
will leave behind what we might think of as the pre-history of reproduction and with 
it the greatest of all ‘ancient and venerable prejudices’. 
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